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JOHN H. FANNING LABOR LAW WRITING
COMPETITION WINNER
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS AND
QUALIFYING CORPORATE PENSION PLANS
UNDER THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT
INCOME SECURITY ACT AFTER
VIZCAINO V. MICROSOFT
Mary Clare Gartland
Small businesses and large corporations are increasingly using tempo-
rary workers, such as independent contractors, to supplement their
workforce.' Many statutes regulating employment relationships, how-
ever, cover "employees" but not independent contractors. The resulting
struggle over a label-employee versus independent contractor-lies at
the center of misclassification disputes.2
Misclassification occurs when businesses classify workers as independ-
ent contractors, but the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) considers them
employees.3 The IRS determines whether a worker is an employee or an
independent contractor by using a twenty-factor common-law test,
4
'J.D. candidate, May 2000, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.
1. See Robert L. Rose, A Special News Report About Life on the Job-and Trends
Taking Shape There, WALL ST. J., April 11, 1995, at Al (reporting on the increasing use of
temporary workers by businesses during the 1990s); see also Laura M. Franze, Temp Work
May Lead to Long-Term Problems, TEX. LAW., June 1, 1998, at 23 (explaining that the
size of the contingent work force is estimated to be "10 percent to 25 percent of total do-
mestic employment"). The contingent work force includes: temporary workers, contract
employees, part-time "project" employees, seasonal workers, independent contractors,
leased employees, consultant workers, and casual employees. See id. Contingent em-
ployment is increasing at 8 to 10 times the rate of employment as a whole, according to the
National Academy of Age and Aging Report on Contingent Employment 1997. See id.
2. See Rebecca Harrison Steele, Employee Benefits and Contingent Workers: Recent
Developments, 45 FED. LAW. 25, 26 (1998) (explaining that as much as 30% to 40% of the
current workforce consists of leased employees or independent contractors).
3. See H. Ngo Higgins, Personnel Audit, 42 NAT'L PUB. AccT. 25, 25 (1997) (ex-
plaining that businesses have faced serious financial trouble including bankruptcy when
the IRS determines workers are classified incorrectly as independent contractors).
4. See Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296, 296-98 (providing three factual situations for
determining whether individuals are employees for the purposes of the Federal Unem-
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commonly referred to as the right-to-control test.5 "No single factor is
determinative, and the language of an agreement will not prevail over
the reality of the relationship."6
Employers need to be wary of worker misclassification, especially be-
cause the IRS has recently intensified its scrutiny of employment rec-
ords.7 Classifying workers incorrectly as independent contractors may
create enormous tax liabilities, including payroll taxes, interest, and pen-
ployment Tax Act (FUTA), the Federal Income Contributions Act (FICA), and the Col-
lection of Income Tax at Source on Wages); see also Myra H. Barron, Who's an Independ-
ent Contractor? Who's an Employee?, 14 LABOR LAW. 457, 462 (1999). Barron summa-
rizes Revenue Ruling 87-41, providing that a worker "would typically be an employee" if
the following factors are present:
1. instructions are given to the worker
2. training is provided to the worker
3. the worker's services are integrated in the business
4. the worker's services are rendered personally
5. the worker is hired, supervised and paid by the company
6. a continuing company-worker relationship exists
7. the worker has set hours of work
8. the worker's full-time services are required
9. work is done on the company's premises
10. there is an order or sequence set by the company for the worker
11. the worker is required to submit reports
12. the worker is paid by the hour, week or month rather than the task
13. the worker is reimbursed for business and/or traveling expenses
14. the employer furnishes the tools/materials
15. no major investment is required by the worker
16. the worker can't realize profit or loss
17. the worker can't work for more than one firm at a time
18. the worker is limited in making services available to the general public
19. the company can discharge the worker
20. the worker can terminate the employment
Id.; see also Laura J. Lokker, Checklist for Determination of Independent Contractor
Status, in AVOIDING WORKPLACE LITIGATION 1997, at 495, 497 (PLI Litig. & Admin.
Practice Course Handbook Series No. H4-5261, 1997) (providing questions for parties to
use in determining whether an independent contractor relationship exists with an em-
ployer).
5. See Thomas M. Murray, Independent Contractor or Employee? Misplaced Reli-
ance on Actual Control Has Disenfranchised Artistic Workers Under the National Labor
Relations Act, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 303, 309 (1998) (providing that the right-to-
control test applies when a company not only directs what work shall be done, but also
how the work is to be done). When a company reserves the right to control the work of a
hired party, the company will be responsible for the acts of the hired party. See id.
6. DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP: EXAMPLES AND
EXPLANATIONS 86 (1998).
7. See Claudia L. Kelley, Worker Misclassification Affects More than FICA,
60 TAX'N FOR ACCr. 96, 96 (Feb. 1998) (explaining that the IRS "has reclassified more
than 400,000 independent contractors as employees" over the past several years as a result
of a nationwide employment tax examination program).
[Vol. 49:505
2000]Independent Contractors and Qualifying Corporate Pension Plans 507
alties.s When employers incorrectly classify common-law employees as
independent contractors, they do not merely owe back taxes on the em-
ployees, but also risk disqualification for preferential tax treatment with
respect to pension plans.9
This risk of disqualification is substantial because the IRS allows cor-
porations tax deductions for providing pension benefits to their employ-
ees. 0 In order to receive these tax benefits, a corporation's pension plan
must meet the requirements of the Employee Retirement Income Secu-
rity Act (ERISA)." ERISA ensures that employers do not extend their
benefit packages solely to high-salaried employees, but also to a large
number of lower-paid employees. Independent contractors, however,
are not included within ERISA's protections. Employers, therefore,
traditionally have not provided benefits to independent contractors."
The Ninth Circuit's recent decisions in Vizcaino v. Microsoft5 highlight
the potential consequences arising from worker misclassification." The
Vizcaino decisions focus on Microsoft's contractual agreements with a
large number of independent contractors. The independent contractors
agreed to forego benefits to obtain higher salaries, in contrast to employ-
8. See id. at 97; Barron, supra note 4, at 461 (explaining employers' tax obligations
to employees). The tax obligations include the employer contributing an employee's share
of Social Security and those payments due under FICA, FUTA, and federal government
income taxes. See id.
9. See Kelley, supra note 7, at 101 (explaining that "[t]he misclassification of work-
ers may result in one or more violations of the qualified plan rules"). However, there are
indications that the IRS will not necessarily disqualify a plan because of misclassification
as long as the employer makes timely corrections and provides the retroactive benefits to
the misclassified workers. See id.
10. See MICHAEL D. ROSE & JOHN C. CHOMMIE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
§ 5.02, at 254 (3d ed. 1988) (providing that the employer receives a tax deduction for a
contribution to a qualified plan on behalf of an employee). Moreover, an employer's con-
tributions to a qualified plan for an employee are not taxable, nor is the income from the
amount contributed. See id. In addition, employees are not taxed on the payments from a
qualified plan until they receive payment. See id.
11. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994)
and scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
12. See Higgins, supra note 3, at 26 ("ERISA established pension-fund standards for
participation, vesting, minimum funding and termination insurance coverage.").
13. See ROSE & CHOMMIE, supra note 10, at 274 (providing that the initial determi-
nation is whether the worker is an employee).
14. See id. (explaining that a qualified benefit plan is exclusively for the benefit of
employees, and that employee status is based on the right-to-control test).
15. 97 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 1996) (Vizcaino 1), vacated, 105 F.3d 1334
(9th Cir. 1997), affd on r'hg en banc, 120 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 1997) (Vizcaino II).
16. See id. at 1189.
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ees performing similar jobs who received benefits but lower salaries. 7
Applying the right-to-control test, the IRS determined that Microsoft's
workers were employees rather than independent contractors. Conse-
quently, the workers sued for employee benefits."
This Note examines the relationship between the determination of in-
dependent contractor status and qualified corporate pension plans in
light of Vizcaino v. Microsoft. First, this Note briefly examines the influ-
ence of common-law agency principles on statutes regulating "employee"
benefits, focusing on the right-to-control test, which courts use to deter-
mine whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor.
Next, this Note traces the procedural history of Vizcaino and analyzes
the issues it presents. This Note then outlines the ERISA regulations
governing qualified pension plans and provides alternative remedies for
avoiding conflicts with the IRS over worker classification. Finally, this
Note concludes by suggesting preventive measures available to employ-
ers seeking to minimize the risks of liability for worker misclassification.
I. EMPLOYEE OR INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR?: USING THE RIGHT-TO-
CONTROL TEST TO DETERMINE EMPLOYMENT STATUS
Common-law agency principles influenced many statutes intended to
regulate or tax modern employment relationships.0 Typically, these
statutes cover employees but not independent contractors, or the statutes
provide an ambiguous definition of employee that gives rise to misclassi-
fication disputes. Consequently, many courts turn to agency principles to
resolve these controversies.2'
The common-law test for determining whether a worker is an em-
ployee or an independent contractor, known as the right-to-control test,
originated in the mid-nineteenth century in English and American courts
to resolve questions of liability in tort cases.22 Initially, the definition of
17. See Alvin D. Lurie, Not a Soft Landing for Microsoft, 73 TAx NOTES 1359, 1359
(1996) (analyzing the Vizcaino II decision and opining on its likely affect on the "tens of
thousands of businesses, large and small" that have sought to supplement their work force
with independent contractors).
18. See Vizcaino II, 120 F.3d at 1008.
19. See id. at 1009.
20. See KLEINBERGER, supra note 6, at 87-88.
21. See discussion infra Parts I.A-D.
22. See Gerald M. Stevens, The Test of the Employment Relation, 38 MICH. L. REV.
188, 189 (1939). The distinction between an employee-employer relationship and an inde-
pendent contractor-employer relationship is important for three main reasons: first, to re-
solve a claim for an employer's liability for the tort of an alleged employee or the duty to
provide workers' compensation; second, for preference under the insolvency statutes or
[Vol. 49:505
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an employee became important in determining vicarious liability under
the doctrine of respondeat superior.3 Early courts applying the right-to-
control test sometimes framed it in terms of "whether the defendant re-
tained the power of [controlling] the work."' 4 In the early twentieth cen-
tury, courts used the analytical framework that originated in the respon-
deat superior cases to determine whether workers were independent
contractors or employees in the context of awarding certain employment
benefits.
A. Early Use of Classification to Award Employee Benefits
In 1921, an Illinois court employed the right-to-control test in deciding
whether a mineworker was an employee or an independent contractor in
Franklin Coal & Coke Co. v. Industrial Commission." An injured
worker became entitled to workers' compensation once the Industrial
Commission determined he was an actual Franklin Company employee.26
The Franklin Company challenged this finding, asserting that the injured
worker was not part of the organized labor force with which the company
had an exclusive contract because the company paid these workers
through expense accounts rather than through payroll.27
The court found that there was no clear rule for defining employment
status to determine whether the worker was an independent contractor
exemptions of employees' wages from garnishment; third, a duty to pay minimum wage or
social security taxes. See id.
23. See id. (explaining that the shift in terminology from master and servant to em-
ployer and employee accompanied the development of workers' compensation legislation,
which clearly defines the two roles). To determine the scope of the vicarious liability with
regard to the relationship between the employer and employees, the definition of an em-
ployee becomes important. See id.
24. Sadler v. Henlock, 119 Eng. Rep. 209, 212 (Q.B. 1855). Sadler is the earliest Eng-
lish case employing the modern control test. Two years after Sadler, an American state
court employed the control test in Boswell v. Laird, 8 Cal. 469 (1857). The Supreme Court
first considered the right-to-control test in Railroad Co. v. Hanning, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 649
(1872). The Court again articulated the right-to-control test in Singer Manufacturing Co.
v. Rahn, 132 U.S. 518 (1889). Company policy became troublesome to Singer because it
reserved the right to prescribe and regulate its horse and wagon driver's business and the
manner in which the driver should do it. See id. at 523. The Court determined, therefore,
that the driver was the company's servant, and because the accident occurred during the
course of employment, the company was responsible for the defendant's acts. See id. at
524.
25. 129 N.E. 811 (I11. 1921).
26. See id. at 812 (explaining that compensation was awarded under the Workmen's
Compensation Act, but then set aside by the circuit court). The worker appealed and the
Supreme Court of Illinois reversed and reinstated the award of workmen's compensation.
See id. at 814.
27. See id. at 813 (articulating the worker's contention that he was paid from the ex-
pense accounts but also was on the payroll for different assignments from the mine).
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or an employee. 8 Explaining that it must consider all factors of employ-
ment together, the court concluded that the principal consideration is
who possesses the right to control the manner of the work performed.29
Defining an independent contractor as "one who undertakes to produce
a given result without being in any way controlled as to the method by
which he attains that result,"' the court classified the worker as an em-
ployee because the employer retained control over his work.3' Accord-
ingly, the court awarded the employee workers' compensation.32
B. 1940 to 1970: The National Labor Relations Board's Treatment of
Independent Contractors and the Right-to-Control Test
Although the Wagner Act of 1935 defined "employee" very broadly
33
thereby making independent contractors eligible for employee benefits,
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) generally withheld benefits
associated with employee status from independent contractors. In re-
fusing to extend benefits to independent contractors, the Board invoked
the right-to-control test to define employment status. 5
In NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc.,36 the Supreme Court considered
whether the right-to-control test should be the exclusive means used to
classify workers as employees or independent contractors. The Hearst
case arose when publishers of four Los Angeles daily newspapers refused
to engage in collective bargaining with a union representing "newsboys"
28. See id. Paraphrasing Bristol & Gale Co. v. Industrial Commission, 126 N.E. 599
(I1l. 1920), the court stated, "It is impossible to lay down a rule by which the status of men
working and contracting together can be definitely defined in all cases as employees or
independent contractors...." Franklin Coal, 129 N.E. at 813.
29. See id. "It is not the actual exercise of the right by interfering with the work but
the right to control which constitutes the test." Id.
30. Id. (explaining that there are many definitions of independent contractors, but
the definitions are not essentially different).
31. See id. The court, finding that the evidence tended to show that the workers were
employees and not independent contractors, reasoned that the employer provided all the
materials and tools necessary, the work was done on the employer's premise, and the
company instructed the workers in all aspects of production. See id
32. See id.
33. See ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW UNIONIZATION AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING § 4, at 28 (1976) (explaining the all-embracing definition of
employee in section 2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act to "include any employee,"
a definition that the author states is "on its face of little utility").
34. See id. (noting that the NLRB had the discretion to provide independent contrac-
tors the benefits of employee status, but it usually withheld these benefits).
35. See id. (finding that the NLRB utilized the right-to-control test to impute liability
to the master for the torts of the servant).
36. 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
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because these workers were not "employees" as defined by the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA).37 Thereafter, the NLRB held proceedings
and classified the regular full-time newspaper carriers as "employees"
within the meaning of NLRA.38 The publishers challenged the NLRB
ruling, arguing that, since Congress did not define the term "employee"
specifically, courts should rely exclusively on "common-law standards" to
distinguish between employees and independent contractors.39
The Supreme Court, however, upheld the NLRB's characterization of
the workers as "employees," rather than independent contractors. Rea-
soning that the broad language of the Wagner Act's definitions rejected
"conventional limitations" on terms like "employee," the Court con-
cluded that the NLRB should not rely solely on common-law standards
to interpret the meaning of terms contained in the Act.4° Instead, the
Court ruled that the NLRB should also consider the "history, terms and
purposes of the legislation,, 41 along with the "underlying economic facts
rather than" making a determination "technically and exclusively by pre-
viously established legal classifications.,
42
In 1947, Congress reacted to Hearst by excluding independent contrac-
tors from the definition of employee in the Taft-Hartley Amendments.43
Since then, the Supreme Court has given greater deference to the
NLRB's decisions regarding employment status by applying the right-to-
control test.44 For example, in NLRB v. United Insurance Co.,45 the Court
employed the right-to-control test to determine if workers were eligible
for the protections of the NLRA.46 The Insurance Workers Union as-
37. See id. at 113.
38. See id. at 131.
39. See id. at 120.
40. See id. at 120, 129.
41. See id. at 124 (explaining the Act's allowance for underlying economic facts to be
assessed rather than relying on the common-law "right to control" test).
42. Id. at 129.
43. See H.R. REP. No. 80-245, at 18 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 309 (1948); H.R.
CONF. REP. NO. 510 ON H.R. 3020, at 32-33 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 536-37 (1948).
44. See NLRB v. United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968). Justice Black concluded:
The obvious purpose of this amendment was to have the Board and the courts
apply general agency principles in distinguishing between employees and inde-
pendent contractors under the Act. Thus there is no doubt that we should apply
the common-law agency test here in disiinguishing an employee from an inde-
pendent contractor.
Id.
45. 390 U.S. 254 (1968).
46. See id. at 256.
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serted that debit agents, who sold insurance and collected premiums
from policyholders, were employees for the purpose of filing an unfair
labor practice action.47 The workers challenged their classification as in-
dependent contractors because the NLRA protected only employees, not
independent contractors.4 The NLRB ruled that, under the Act, the
agents were employees.49 Reviewing the Seventh Circuit's refusal to en-
force the NLRB ruling, the Court applied common-law agency principles
and concurred with the NLRB finding that debit agents were employ-
50ees.
C. The 1980s: Application of the Right-to-Control Test in ERISA Cases
After encountering numerous political obstacles and much public de-
bate, Congress enacted ERISA in 1974 in response to concerns regarding
inadequacies in the existing law governing private pension systems.5
One shortcoming of ERISA is the legislation's lack of a clear defini-
tion of "employee," which would be useful in classifying workers as em-
ployees or independent contractors. 2  ERISA defines "employee"
merely as "any individual employed by an employer."53 As one court
noted, "the statutory definition thus provides little or no guidance when
the question is whether a party performing services pursuant to a par-
ticular work arrangement is an employee.' Accordingly, litigation
raising the question of whether an individual is an employee or an inde-
pendent contractor for purposes of ERISA involves both an interpreta-
tion of the statute and an application of common-law principles of
55
agency.
In Holt v. Winpisinger,56 the United States Court of Appeals for the
47. See id. at 255.
48. See id. at 255 n.1.
49. See id. at 255.
50. See id. at 258-59 (explaining that "there is no shorthand formula or magic phrase"
to determine employee status, but that all factors are assessed and weighed equally).
51. See JAY CONISON, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN A NUTSHELL 69-76 (1993). ERISA
represents reconciliation between advocates who view pension plan law as labor legisla-
tion and others who approach it as tax legislation. See id.
52. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6) (1994) (defining "employee").
53. Id.
54. Holt v. Winpisinger, 811 F.2d 1532, 1538 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
55. See id. at 1536, 1538 & n.44 (concluding that the absence of a comprehensive
definition of "employee" and other features of ERISA plainly indicate Congress' intent to
allow the Secretary of Labor to continue the longstanding practice of distinguishing be-
tween "employees" and "independent contractors" by applying common-law agency prin-
ciples).
56. 811 F.2d 1532 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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District of Columbia Circuit applied the common-law right-to-control
test to find an employee eligible for ERISA benefits for her entire tenure
of employment." Although, the employer originally classified Holt as an
independent contractor, after one year Holt became a full-time em-
ployee. Despite the reclassification, Holt's duties and all other work-
related circumstances remained the same during her entire tenure of em-
ployment." A dispute arose because Holt's pension benefits did not vest
until she became a full-time employee.6° On the date of her termination,
therefore, she was one year short of pension eligibility.6' Applying the
right-to-control test, the court found that Holt was an employee for the
first year of her employment and therefore eligible for a pension."
Several years later, the Supreme Court entered the ERISA classifica-
tion foray and employed the right-to-control test in Nationwide Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Darden." In Darden, a former insurance agent brought
57. See id. at 1542.
58. See id. at 1534 (explaining that after a year, Holt was hired on a full-time basis
with the title of Office Manager).
59. See id. (providing that Holt performed the same tasks and reported to the same
supervisor after being hired full-time).
60. See id.
61. See id. (providing that the Financial Officer received notice of Holt's full-time
employment and that Holt's pension credits should start on the date she was hired as a
full-time employee).
62. See id. at 1540-41 (explaining that Holt was an employee for the first year at IAM,
and that this year should have been calculated into the necessary 10 years of service for
entitlement to the accrued benefits).
63. 503 U.S. 318 (1992). Several years before Darden, the Supreme Court applied the
right-to-control test to determine employment status in a dispute over ownership of a
sculpture copyright in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
In Reid, two competing parties sought copyright ownership of a sculpture. See id. at 732-
33. Petitioner, Community for Creative Non-Violence, entered into an oral agreement
with respondent Reid, a sculptor, to obtain a statue that depicted homelessness for display
at a Christmas pageant. See id. After completion of the statue, both parties filed com-
peting copyright registration certificates for the statue. See id. The parties brought the
case to determine who held the copyright. See id.
The Court used common-law agency principles to determine the sculptor's employment
status in resolving the copyright issue, finding that the sculptor was an independent con-
tractor under the right-to-control test. See id. at 731. The Court outlined the factors for
the right-to-control test and weighed them equally, with no one factor being decisive. See
id. at 751-52.
In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the general common
law of agency, we consider the hiring party's right to control the manner and
means by which the product is accomplished. Among the other factors relevant
to this inquiry are the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools;
the location of the work; the duration of the relationship between the parties;
whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired
party; the extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how long to work;
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an action under ERISA to recover retirement benefits.6' In order for
Darden to claim the proceeds of the retirement plan under ERISA, he
would have to be an "employee."65 Relying on common-law agency prin-
ciples, the Court employed the right-to-control test in determining
whether Darden was an "employee" within the meaning of ERISA.
66
D. The Right-to-Control Test in the 1990s: Challenges to Contractual
Agreements Purporting to Classify Employment Relationships
Even contractual agreements purporting to classify workers as inde-
pendent contractors, rather than employees, may not prevail over the
the method of payment; the hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants;
whether the work is part of the regular business of hiring party; whether the hir-
ing party is in business; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment
of the hired party.
Id. (citations omitted).
64. See Darden, 503 U.S. at 320 (explaining that the contract between Darden and
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. included a retirement plan that would be forfeited if
Darden sold, within a year of termination, insurance for Nationwide's competitors).
65. See id. at 320-21 (stating that the district court granted Nationwide's motion for
summary judgment because Darden was not a proper ERISA plaintiff because he was an
independent contractor, not an employee as required by ERISA).
66. See id. at 323 (explaining that when ERISA does not clearly define "employee,"
the presumption is that Congress intended the common law of agency to be the test). A
federal district court applied a similar test for determining employee status in EEOC v.
Fawn Vendors, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 909, 910-11 (S.D. Tex. 1996). In this case, the plaintiff
asserted a Title VII action alleging that Fawn Vendors subjected workers to a sexually
hostile work environment and failed to take appropriate corrective action. See id. at 910.
Because a successful Title VII action must involve an employment relationship, the court
applied an "economic realities/common-law control" test employed by the Fifth Circuit.
See id. at 911. This test includes the same factors used in Reid, and considers all factors
equally. See id. The economic reality test currently applies to cases involving the Fair La-
bor Standards Act (FLSA) (which pertains to minimum wages and overtime pay). See
Barron, supra note 4, at 460. The economic reality test gives courts a broader view of em-
ployment circumstances, focusing on the circumstances of the whole activity. See id. Bar-
ron summarized the following six factors in the economic reality test by which a worker
will most likely be classified as an employee:
1. a limited amount of the worker's investment in facilities and equipment
2. the nature (close supervision) and degree of control (high) retained or exer-
cised by the company
3. the worker's limited opportunities for profit and loss
4. the small degree of the worker's independent initiative, judgment, and fore-
sight in open market competition with others required for the success of the op-
eration
5. a high degree of permanency of the work relationship
6. the broad extent to which the services are an integral part of the company's
business
Id. at 466-67. After weighing all of these factors, the Fawn court found the plaintiff to be
an employee and not an independent contractor. See Fawn Vendors, 965 F. Supp. at 913.
66. See Darden, 503 U.S. at 323-24.
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factual and economic reality of the employment relationship. In
Daughtrey v. Honeywell, Inc.," the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit employed the right-to-control test in reviewing a claim for
ERISA benefits when a company classified a worker incorrectly. 68 The
court held that the contractual agreement Daughtrey signed stating that
she was an independent contractor, thereby waiving all benefits provided
by Honeywell to its employees, was not dispositive of her employment
status.69 Although finding that a contractual agreement may demonstrate
the parties' intent, the court concluded that Daughtrey was a Honeywell
employee after reviewing all the factors under the right-to-control test.
7 0
A recent decision from the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit stirs
controversy over such employee agreements that essentially waive all
rights to benefits.7  In Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. v. Ratcliff,2 newspaper
carriers challenged the Kansas City Star Newspaper (owned by Capital
Cities/ABC, Inc.), claiming they were eligible for ERISA benefits.73 The
carriers challenged the publishers' denial of benefits because the IRS
found that many of the carriers were common-law employees.74 The
court held that an agency agreement, in which workers acknowledged
they were not employees and were ineligible for benefits, foreclosed the
workers' rights to benefits under the company's ERISA plans.75
The Capital Cities court relied76 on Boren v. Southwestern Bell Tele-
phone Co." In Boren, the plaintiff had a series of one-year service con-
67. 3 F.3d 1488 (11th Cir. 1993).
68. See id. at 1492.
69. See id. at 1492-93 (finding employment status is not determined from the label
used in the contract for purposes of ERISA).
70. See id. at 1492 (explaining that for ERISA purposes, the test employed is the
common-law test articulated in Reid).
71. See Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. v. Ratcliff, 141 F.3d 1405 (10th Cir. 1998).
72. 141 F.3d 1405 (10th Cir. 1998).
73. See id. at 1408 (explaining that a group of carriers in 1991 formally requested
ERISA benefits under the Kansas City Star's four ERISA plans).
74. See id. After an audit in 1991, the IRS issued a Technical Advice Memorandum
concluding that, under the right-to-control test, many of the newspaper carriers were
common-law employees of the Kansas City Star. See id. The IRS later retracted this de-
termination. See id. at 1408 n.2. The factual situation in Capital Cities is very similar to
Vizcaino, where workers filed a class action for ERISA benefits after the IRS determined
that the workers were employees.
75. See id. at 1405.
76. See id. at 1409 (refuting the assertion that Boren was overruled by Darden). The
Capital Cities court held that service contracts define the relationship between employer
and worker and determine the rights of the parties accordingly. See id.
77. 933 F.2d 891 (10th Cir. 1991).
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tracts with Southwestern Bell for a twenty-five year tenure.78 The service
contracts were silent on the issue of employee status for the first twelve
years.79 For the most recent thirteen years, the service contracts specifi-
cally referred to the plaintiff as an independent contractor and stated
that he was not an employee "for any purpose."" Hence, the Boren
court did not apply the right-to-control test because it found that the
service contracts between the parties defined their relationship and de-
termined the rights regarding ERISA benefits." The court held, there-
fore, that the express terms of the employment contract, in which the
plaintiff agreed he was not an employee, prevented him from claiming
ERISA benefits."
In addition to Boren, the Capital Cities court also relied on Bronk v.
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph, Inc.,83 which provided that
employers may exclude certain employees from their benefits plans.W In
Bronk, leased employees brought an ERISA action for wrongful denial
of participation in benefit plans. 8 Determining that ERISA regulations
did not require the employer to include leased employees in the benefit
plan,g the court explained that ERISA regulations are meant to deter-
mine whether a plan qualifies for preferential tax status, and not to force
companies to include all common-law employees in their plans.8
78. See id. at 892 (explaining that the series of one-year contracts between Boren and
Southwestern Bell were for architectural supervision services).
79. See id.
80. See id. The carriers argued that Boren was overruled by Nationwide Mutual In-
surance Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992). See Capital Cities, 141 F.3d at 1409. The
Capital Cities court explained that Darden merely held that the right-to-control test de-
termines only employee status for ERISA benefits, not that any worker meeting this de-
termination is entitled to ERISA benefits. See id. The court further found that not all
common-law employees must receive coverage from their employer. See id.
81. See Boren, 933 F.2d at 894.
82. See id.
83. 140 F.3d 1335 (10th Cir. 1998).
84. See Capital Cities, 141 F.3d at 1409.
85. See Bronk, 140 F.3d at 1336 (providing that the leased employees justified their
entitlement to the pension and welfare benefits because they performed "same or similar"
functions as employees).
86. See id. at 1338 (explaining that ERISA allows an employer to distinguish between
groups or categories of employees, including providing benefits to only a select group).
87. See id. at 1339 ("Code provisions do not require ERISA plans to include leased
employees; they merely require employers to take leased employees into account in
showing that their plans meet the nondiscriminatory coverage requirements of the
Code.").
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II. VIZCAINO V. MICROSOFT. FORMER INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS
SUE FOR EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
A. Origin of the Dispute: Workers Sign Independent Contractor
Agreements at Time of Hire to Obtain Higher Salaries Instead of Benefits
In Vizcaino, eight workers brought a class action against Microsoft
Corporation claiming that they were entitled to savings benefits under
the Savings Plus Plan (SPP) and stock options benefits under the Em-
ployee Stock Purchase Plan (ESPP).8 Microsoft asserted that the work-
ers were independent contractors and consequently denied the workers'
claim to participation in the SPP and ESPP.s9
Microsoft employed the Vizcaino plaintiffs as freelance workers before
1990 to perform various services including production editing, proof-
reading, and formatting. ° The plaintiffs performed these services for
continuous periods.91 At the time of hire, each plaintiff had signed an
agreement explicitly foregoing benefits from Microsoft.9
Microsoft later integrated the plaintiffs and other freelance workers
into the corporate workforce, 93 making several distinctions between the
independent contractors and the employees.94 One of the major distinc-
tions was that the independent contractors submitted invoices to the Ac-
88. See Vizcaino v. Microsoft, 97 F.3d 1187, 1189-90 (9th Cir. 1996) (Vizcaino I); see
also Craig Wheaton, Companies Manage Contingent Workers to Avoid Microsoft Trap,
TRIANGLE Bus. J., April 10, 1998, at 9H (stating that the class suing Microsoft sought ret-
roactive benefits, specifically the SPP and ESPP benefit plans). The class, originally com-
posed of Donna Vizcaino and seven other freelance workers, now numbers approximately
5000. See id.
89. See Vizcaino 1, 97 F.3d at 1191.
90. See id. at 1190.
91. See id. (explaining that the workers performed services for continuous periods
often exceeding two years).
92. See id. At the time of hiring each plaintiff signed a "Microsoft Corporation Inde-
pendent Contractor Copyright Assignment and Non-Disclosure Agreement" providing
that the worker would be "responsible for all federal and state taxes, withholding, social
security, insurance and other benefits," and an "Independent Contractor/Freelancer In-
formation" document stating, "[A]s an Independent Contractor to Microsoft, you are self-
employed and are responsible to pay all your own insurance and benefits." Id.
93. See id. (noting that the freelancers worked on the same teams with regular em-
ployees, shared the same supervisors, performed identical functions, and worked the same
core hours as employees).
94. See id. (explaining that the physical differences between the independent contrac-
tors and regular employees included different color badges and different e-mail account
addresses). The independent contractors were not invited to official company functions,
did not receive salaries, nor were they allowed to assign their work to others. See id.
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counts Payable department for their paychecks instead of submitting
their time sheets to the Payroll department.95 In 1989 and 1990, the IRS
examined Microsoft's employment records and concluded that the com-
pany's independent contractors were actually common-law employees.9
Microsoft complied with the IRS determination by issuing W-2 forms to
the former "independent contractors" and paid the employee's share of
their FICA taxes.97
After complying with the IRS decision, Microsoft changed its system
for the freelance workers.98 Microsoft offered some freelance workers
permanent employee positions, while offering the remaining workers the
opportunity to work for a temporary employment agency that supplied
workers to Microsoft on an as-needed basis.99 Some of the freelance
workers sued Microsoft, claiming entitlement to the SPP and ESPP bene-
fits based on the IRS decision and the fact that the two benefit plans
were available to employees.' °°
1. Vizcaino I
In Vizcaino I, the district court referred the matter to a magistrate
judge following cross-motions for summary judgment.' 1 The magistrate
judge recommended an award in favor of the plaintiffs on the SPP and
ESPP benefit plans' issues.'O The district court did not adopt the magis-
trate judge's recommendation in its entirety, however, and granted Mi-
crosoft's motion for summary judgment. 3
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court
95. See id. ("[T]hey were not paid through Microsoft's payroll department. Instead,
they submitted invoices for their services, documenting their hours and the projects on
which they worked, and were paid through the accounts receivable department.").
96. See id. (stating that the IRS applied common-law principles to determine that the
independent contractors were actually employees, and that Microsoft should have been
withholding taxes and paying certain taxes for these workers).
97. See id. at 1190-91.
98. See id. at 1191.
99. See id. Microsoft tendered offers to those workers who remained in essentially
the same relationship as before the reclassification. See id. The other workers had the
opportunity to work for the temporary employment agency that supplied workers to Mi-
crosoft. See id.
100. See id.; Vizcaino v. Microsoft, 120 F.3d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc)
(Vizcaino I) (explaining that a panel was convened which ruled that "the Workers were
not entitled to any benefits from ... the SPP-or... the ESPP ... because the [w]orkers
had agreed that they were independent contractors and because they had waived the right
to participate in benefit plans." Id.
101. See Vizcaino I, 97 F.3d at 1191.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 1192.
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and determined that the workers should participate in the SPP and ESPP
plans. 1m For the SPP plan, Microsoft contended that the workers were
not eligible to participate because they were not on the payroll.105
ERISA regulations govern SPP plans and require all employees "on the
United States payroll of the employer" to be eligible for participation in
such plans.' °6 The court looked to the terms of Microsoft's SPP plan and
other manifestations of intent (extrinsic evidence) to interpret its provi-
sions. 7
The court found the terms of the plan ambiguous and concluded that,
but for the erroneous misclassification, Microsoft would have intended to
give the workers employee benefits.' °s Regardless of whether the work-
ers were paid through the payroll account or accounts payable, the court
concluded that ERISA regulations entitled the workers to participate in
the SPP.' 9
The court also determined that Microsoft improperly excluded the
workers from participation in the ESPP,"' which permitted all regular
employees to participate."' The workers were therefore entitled to par-
ticipate based on the IRS ruling that Microsoft mistakenly classified the
workers as independent contractors rather than employees.'12
2. Vizcaino II: Rehearing En Banc
After Vizcaino I, Microsoft petitioned the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit for a rehearing en banc." 3 Sitting en banc, the Ninth Cir-
104. See id. at 1196-1200.
105. See id. at 1193.
106. See id. at 1192-93.
107. See id. at 1194.
108. See Amy L. Short, Note, Workers Misclassified As Independent Contractors Were
Entitled To Retirement Benefits: Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 51 TAx LAw. 405,408 (1998)
(explaining that the Vizcaino I three-judge panel conceded Microsoft's intention was not
to give benefits to the independent contractors). The panel, however, "framed the issue as
whether Microsoft would have intended to give the workers benefits had they known that
the workers were legally employees." Id. Finding the phrase "on the United States pay-
roll of the employer" too ambiguous to determine conclusively for either side, the panel
applied the doctrine of contra proferentum, by construing the ambiguity against Microsoft,
the drafter. See id.; Vizcaino I, 97 F.3d at 1191. After applying the doctrine of contra pro-
ferentum to the phrase "on the United States payroll of the employer," the Vizcaino I
panel concluded that the workers were eligible for the SPP benefits. See Vizcaino , 97 F.3d at
1191.
109. See Vizcaino 1, 97 F.3d at 1196.
110. See id. at 1197.
111. See id. at 1198.
112. See id.
113. See Vizcaino v. Micrsoft Corp., 120 F.3d 1006, 1008 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc)
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cuit found the workers eligible for benefits under the SPP because they
were employees (as now conceded by Microsoft) and not independent
contractors.
114
The workers' participation in the SPP was subject, however, to their
being "on the United States payroll of the employer.""..5 The court de-
termined that the plan administrator has the primary duty of construing
the phrase, "on the United States payroll of the employer.""' 6 This find-
ing overruled the Vizcaino I three-judge panel's decision that the court
could have the primary duty of construing this phrase."7 The court di-
rected the plan administrator to determine whether the workers were en-
titled to participate in the SPP based on his or her construction of the
phrase." 8 In Vizcaino II, the court determined the SPP was an ERISA
plan."9
For participation in ESPP, the court agreed generally with the
Vizcaino I panel's finding.' 20 In contrast, however, the court determined
that the workers could have accepted the contract without knowing the
precise terms of the plan.'2' The court remanded the ESPP issues to the
district court and the SPP issues to the plan administrator.22 Microsoft's
plan administrator determined that the workers were not entitled to SPP
(Vizcaino H1).
114. See id. at 1013 (reiterating that Microsoft's decision to deny participation to the
workers based upon the "supposed independent contractor status of the Workers" was
wrong (which Microsoft conceded)).
115. See id. ( "We are asked to decide what is meant by the SPP's restriction of bene-
fits to common-law employees who are 'on the United States payroll of the employer."').
116. See id. The court insisted that it would not "be seduced into making a decision
which belongs to the plan administrator in the-first instance." Id.
117. See id. (encouraging the "dumping of difficult and discretionary decisions into the
laps of the courts" despite one of the purposes of ERISA being to avoid courts taking the
time and effort to resolve such issues).
118. See id. (stating that the court would set poor precedent if it was to decide the is-
sue of plan construction before the plan administrator had a chance to consider the issue
and rule on it).
119. See id. at 1013.
120. See Short, supra note 108, at 408. In Vizcaino I, the court held that the workers
were covered under the ESPP because the court "applied the 'objective manifestation
theory of contracts,' which requires imputation of 'an intention corresponding to the rea-
sonable meaning of a person's words and acts."' Id. (quoting Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp.,
97 F.3d 1187, 1196 (9th Cir. 1996) (Vizcaino 1)). The court found in Microsoft's plan
documents an objective intent to make all common-law employees eligible for participa-
tion. See id. at 409. The workers, therefore, were eligible because they were common law
employees. See id. The court on rehearing en banc agreed with this finding that the
workers were eligible for the ESPP. See Vizcaino H, 120 F.3d at 1014-15.
121. See Vizcaino II, 120 F.3d at 1014 (remanding to the district court for a determina-
tion of an appropriate remedy).
122. See id. at 1015.
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benefits because they were independent contractors."z Thereafter, the
court reviewed the denial of benefits to decide whether Microsoft's deci-
sion was arbitrary or capricious.2 4
The court found that Microsoft's decision to deny benefits was arbi-
trary and capricious because the corporation based its decision on an er-
roneous application of the workers' classification.'2' The court remanded
the case to the plan administrator to reconsider the workers' claims, spe-
cifically their eligibility for the SPP benefits. 26
B. Five Separate and Distinct Opinions
Fourteen judges took part in formulating the final Vizcaino decision,
producing five distinct opinions on appeal.' There are two majority
opinions, two dissents (one with a partial concurrence), and one concur-
ring opinion with a partial dissent between the original three-judge panel
and the eleven judges hearing the case en banc.'8
The majority decision by the Ninth Circuit in Vizcaino I denied Micro-
soft the right to contract with freelance workers in order to exclude them
from the benefits available to its employees.'29 The court sitting en banc,
however, dismissed this clearly-stated rule by assuming Microsoft did not
intend to exclude the freelance workers from the benefit plans; instead,
the court held that Microsoft mistakenly believed that the workers were
independent contractors rather than employees.' ° As a result, although
worker misclassification accounted for the genesis of the dispute in
Vizcaino, the Ninth Circuit never reached the question of whether the
freelance temporary workers were actually employees because Microsoft
conceded the issue.'' Thus, Vizcaino does not help clarify the law or
123. See id. at 1013.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 1014 (explaining that the determination for eligibility of SPP benefits is
a new issue for the plan administrator and should, therefore, first be decided by the plan
administrator and then be reviewed by the court).
127. See Alvin D. Lurie, Microsoft Gets Due-Processed in Federal Court, 76 TAX
NOTEs 1633, 1633 (1997).
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id. (concluding that the en banc majority "punted, mooting the central issue
of exclusion-by-contract by assuming that Microsoft obviously would have meant to ex-
clude the plaintiffs from its benefit plans if it had only realized that they were truly its
common-law employees").
131. See Vizcaino II, 120 F.3d at 1010 (explaining that the en banc court did not con-
sider the issue of whether the workers were "employees" in Vizcaino II because "both Mi-
crosoft and the SPP have conceded ... that the Workers were common law employees").
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provide guidance to industries in classifying workers. 32 On the contrary,
the case highlights the potential consequences of misclassification.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF VIZCAINO H ON QUALIFYING CORPORATE
PENSION PLANS
ERISA regulations provide employees with federal statutory protec-
133tion from employer abuses of private pension systems. Congress en-
acted ERISA to protect employees from corrupt management of pension
plans and to prevent exclusion of certain employees from benefits
plans.' 34
ERISA regulations create incentives that help protect Microsoft work-
ers because the SPP plan entitles Microsoft to considerable tax savings.
In order for Microsoft to receive tax preferential treatment, however, the
corporation's SPP plan must meet the requirements for a qualified
plan."' These requirements ensure minimum participation standards and
132. See Lurie, supra note 127, at 1633 (explaining that the worker classification ques-
tion of whether the plaintiffs were employees or independent contractors was an impor-
tant issue in the case). The worker classification issue was not resolved because the ma-
jority noted that Microsoft conceded that the workers were employees for the purposes of
the appeal. See id. Therefore, "the case has decided very little of importance to the de-
velopment of the law or for the guidance of high-tech electronics and service industries."
Id. This also influences other industries using part-time workers, leased employees and
contingent labor providers. See id. The Teamsters' UPS strike also brought the increasing
use of a part-time workforce to the public's attention. See id. However, the "payroll" is-
sue may be reviewed further. See id. at 1634. On remand, the district court could give "on
the United States payroll of the employer" a broad interpretation, as the three-judge panel
did in Vizcaino I. See id. If the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals were to affirm that deci-
sion, then there could potentially be a conflict with the Fourth Circuit's unpublished con-
trary decision in Clark v. E. Dupont DeNemours, No. 95-2845 (4th Cir. 1997) (per cu-
riam). See id.
133. See ROSE & CHOMMIE, supra note 10, at 254. ERISA protects workers by limit-
ing an employer's ability to impose eligibility requirements and requiring employees to
have a non-forfeitable right to the benefit package after a predetermined number of years
of participating in the plan. See id. The legislation also requires minimum funding stan-
dards to assure financial soundness of the plan and imposes fiduciary standards on the
trustees of the plan. See id. ERISA mandates certain reporting and disclosure require-
ments on employers and establishes a plan insurance agency, the Pension Benefit Guar-
anty Corporation. See id.
134. See id. at 255. ERISA proscribes employers from establishing benefit plans only
for officers, directors, and other highly compensated employees, while leaving out the
lower paid workers. See id. Without ERISA, most workers would not have a pension
from their employer. See id. Congress wanted to prevent this result by enacting the Inter-
nal Revenue Code provisions for qualifying a pension plan for tax beneficial status. See id.
135. See I.R.C. § 401(a) (Supp. 1999) (requiring that a trust that is created or organ-
ized within the United States that forms a stock bonus, pension, or profit-sharing plan of
an employer that exclusively benefits the employer's employees, must meet certain re-
quirements to constitute a qualified trust).
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non-discriminatory allocation of eligibility.16
Misclassification can disqualify a pension plan if the plan does not
meet the numerical eligibility test.37 When courts or regulators find that
independent contractors are common-law employees, disqualification
may occur because the employer failed to include the formerly misclas-
sifed workers in the test qualifying the plan.'8 The Supreme Court could
easily resolve this conflict by providing clarification and guidance for
employers. 9
A. Requirements for Qualifying a Pension Plan under ERISA
Under IRS regulations, pension, profit sharing, and stock-bonus plans
must meet certain requirements for qualification. These pension plans
are established primarily to provide employees with retirement
136. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(3)-(4) (Supp. 1999) (providing that a plan is a qualified trust
"if the plan of which such trust is a part satisfies the requirements of section 410 (relating
to minimum participation standards)" and "if the contributions or benefits provided under
the plan do not discriminate in favor of highly compensated employees (within the mean-
ing of 414(q))").
137. See Kelley, supra note 7, at 101 & n.34 (stating that misclassification of workers
may result in numerous violations of the qualifying rules for ERISA).
138. See Timothy J. Snyder, Bulletproof Your Qualified Plans, DEL. EMPLOYMENT L.
LETTER, May 1998 (urging employers to "[mjake sure that all workers who are eligible to
participate in the plan do so"). There is a "plethora" of ways the qualification provision
can be violated. See id. The first is by misclassifying workers as independent contractors
and excluding them from participation in the pension plan. See id. A company may, how-
ever, exclude independent contractors from its plan if the plan provides specifically that
independent contractors may not participate. See id. Notwithstanding, the plan must still
meet the coverage tests under ERISA with the independent contractors excluded. See id.
139. See Lurie, supra note 127, at 1634 (explaining that if there was a conflict between
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals on the "pay-
roll" issue, the Supreme Court would have the "jurisdictional hook needed for certio-
rari").
140. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(1)-(4) (Supp. 1999).
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benefits.14' The first requirement of a qualified plan involves defining a
A trust created or organized in the United States and forming part of a stock bo-
nus, pension, or profit-sharing plan of an employer for the exclusive benefit of his
employees or their beneficiaries shall constitute a qualified trust under this
section-
(1) if contributions are made to the trust by such employer, or employees, or
both, or by another employer who is entitled to deduct his contributions under
section 404(a)(3)(B) (relating to deduction for contributions to profit-sharing
and stock bonus plans), or by a charitable remainder trust pursuant to a qualified
gratuitous transfer (as defined in section 664(g)(1)), for the purpose of distribut-
ing to such employees or their beneficiaries the corpus and income of the fund
accumulated by the trust in accordance with such plan;
(2) if under the trust instrument it is impossible, at any time prior to the satisfac-
tion of all liabilities with respect to employees and their beneficiaries under the
trust, for any part of the corpus or income to be (within the taxable year or
thereafter) used for, or diverted to, purposes other than for the exclusive benefit
of his employees or their beneficiaries (but this paragraph shall not be construed,
in the case of a multiemployer plan, to prohibit the return of a contribution
within 6 months after the plan administrator determines that the contribution
was made by a mistake of fact or law (other than a mistake relating to whether
the plan is described in section 401(a) or the trust which is part of such plan is ex-
empt from taxation under section 501(a), or the return of any withdrawal liability
payment determined to be an overpayment within 6 months of such determina-
tion));
(3) if the plan of which such trust is a part satisfies the requirements of section
410 (relating to minimum participation standards); and
(4) if the contributions or benefits provided under the plan do not discriminate in
favor of highly compensated employees (within the meaning of section 414(q)).
For purposes of this paragraph, there shall be excluded from consideration em-
ployees described in section 410(b)(3)(A) and (C).
Id.
141. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(i) (as amended in 1976). This regulation provides:
A pension plan within the meaning of section 401(a) is a plan established and
maintained by an employer primarily to provide systematically for the payment
of definitely determinable benefits to his employees over a period of years, usu-
ally for life, after retirement. Retirement benefits generally are measured by,
and based on, such factors as years of service and compensation received by the
employees. The determination of the amount of retirement benefits and contri-
butions to provide such benefits are not dependent upon profits. Benefits are not
definitely determinable if funds arising from forfeitures on termination of serv-
ice, or other reason, may be used to provide increased benefits for the remaining
participants (see § 1.401-7, relating to the treatment of forfeitures under a quali-
fied pension plan). A plan designed to provide benefits for employees or their
beneficiaries to be paid upon retirement or over a period of years after retire-
ment will, for the purposes of section 401(a), be considered a pension plan if the
employer contributions under the plan can be determined actuarially on the basis
of definitely determinable benefits, or, as in the case of money purchase pension
plans, such contributions are fixed without being geared to profits. A pension
plan may provide for the payment of a pension due to disability and may also
provide for the payment of incidental death benefits through insurance or other-
wise. However, a plan is not a pension plan if it provides for the payment of
benefits not customarily included in a pension plan such as layoff benefits or
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"plan." '142 The plan, maintained by an employer, is a written program and
arrangement communicated to the employees.
Employees' eligibility for participating in a pension plan is determina-
tive of a qualified plan.'44 Qualified plans may not require as a condition
of participation a term of service of more than one year or a requirement
to remain a member beyond the date the employee reaches age twenty-
one.' 5  If an employee satisfies the minimum service requirement or
minimum age, the employee must start participating, beginning on the
date the employee satisfied the requirement or within six months of that
date.'"'
The IRS designed eligibility tests to ensure that employers extend
benefit plans to rank-and-file employees, so that most workers would be
covered by private pension plans.147 Numerical eligibility tests define the
number and percentage of a workforce that employers need to include in
benefits for sickness, accident, hospitalization, or medical expenses (except medi-
cal benefits described in section 401(h) as defined in paragraph (a) of § 1.401-14).
Id.
142. See ROSE & CHOMMIE, supra note 10, at 259; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(a)(2)
(as amended in 1976) (defining a plan as "a definite written program and arrangement
which is communicated to the employees and which is established and maintained by an
employer").
143. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(a)(2) (as amended in 1976) (providing the definition of
qualified pension plans, profit-sharing plans, and stock bonus plans).
144. See ROSE & CHOMMIE, supra note 10, at 262.
145. See I.R.C. § 410(a)(1)(A) (1998).
A trust shall not constitute a qualified trust under section 410(a) if the plan of
which it is a part requires, as a condition of participation in the plan, that an em-
ployee complete a period of service with the employer or employers maintaining
the plan extending beyond the later of the following dates-
the date on which the employee attains the age of 21;
or the date on which he completes 1 year of service.
Id.; see also I.R.C. § 410(a)(1)(B)(i) (1998) (providing an exception when the plan pro-
vides a two-year service requirement if the employee is 100% vested after two years of
service).
146. See I.R.C. § 410(a)(4) (1998).
A plan shall be treated as not meeting the requirements of paragraph (1) unless it
provides that any employee who has satisfied the minimum age and service re-
quirements specified in such paragraph, and who is otherwise entitled to partici-
pate in the plan, commences participation in the plan no later than the earlier of-
(A) the first year of the first plan year beginning after the date on which such
employee satisfied such requirements, or
(B) the date 6 months after the date on which he satisfied such requirements,
unless such employee was separated from the service before the date referred to
in subparagraph (A) or (B), whichever is applicable.
Id.; see also ROSE & CHOMMIE, supra note 10, at 262.
147. See ROSE & CHOMMIE, supra note 10, at 255 (explaining that employers may ex-
tend benefit plans only to officers, shareholders, and highly compensated employees).
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 49:505
the pension plan to achieve qualified status.14' The numerical tests pro-
vide that either at least seventy percent of all employees must benefit
from the plan, or at least eighty percent of all employees eligible to bene-
fit must participate (provided that seventy percent of all employees are
eligible to benefit from the plan).149
An alternative test requires a "fair cross section" of employees in sal-
ary ranges to participate in the plan.5 This test has special rules regard-
ing the highly compensated employees in addition to the rules regarding
discrimination.' The Tax Reform Act of 1986 changed the rules for
148. See I.R.C. § 410(b)(1), (b)(2)(A) (1998).
149. See ROSE & CHOMMIE, supra note 10, at 262 (explaining that certain employees
may be excluded from a numerical eligibility test for determining qualifications in a bene-
fits plan). The excluded employees usually are those who did not satisfy the plan's mini-
mum service or age conditions. See id. Therefore, these numerical tests are calculated
based on the number of employees after exclusions. See id.
150. See Treas. Reg. § 1,410(b)-1(d)(2) (as amended in 1993). The regulations pro-
vide:
Discrimination. The determination as to whether a plan discriminates in favor of
employees who are officers, shareholders, or highly compensated is made on the
basis of the facts and circumstances of each case, allowing a reasonable differ-
ence between the ratio of such employees benefited by the plan to all such em-
ployees of the employer and the ratio of the employees (other than officers,
shareholders, or highly compensated) of the employer benefited by the plan to
all employees (other than officers, shareholders, or highly compensated). A
showing that a specified percentage of employees covered by a plan are not offi-
cers, shareholders, or highly compensated, is not in itself sufficient to establish
that the plan does not discriminate in favor of employees who are officers, share-
holders, or highly compensated.
Id.
151. See Treas. Reg. § 1.410(b)-(1)(d)(1) (as amended in 1993).
Special rules--(1) Highly compensated. The classification of an employee as
highly compensated for purposes of section 410(b)(1)(B) and § 1.410(b)-l(b)(2)
is made on the basis of the facts and circumstances of each case, taking into ac-
count the level of the employee's compensation and the level of compensation
paid by the employer to other employees, whether or not covered by the plan.
Average compensation levels determined on a local, regional, or national basis,
are not relevant for this purpose. Further, the classification of an employee as
highly compensated is not made solely on the basis of the number or percentage
of employees whose compensation exceeds, or is exceeded by, the employee's.
Id.; see also I.R.C. § 414(q)(1) (1998) (defining the term highly compensated employee):
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participation tests for plan years beginning after December 31, 1998.152
B. Careful Preparation Can Alleviate Liability: How to Avoid
Misclassification Problems
After Vizcaino H, employers must take great care in identifying accu-
rately, from the hiring date, whether the worker is an employee or an in-.153
dependent contractor. Businesses should also use preventive meas-
The term "highly compensated employee" means any employee who-
(A) was a 5-percent owner at any time during the year or the preceding year, or
(B) for the preceding year-
(i) had compensation from the employer in excess of $80,000, and
(ii) if the employer elects the application of this clause for such preceding
year, was in the top-paid group of employees for such preceding year.
The Secretary shall adjust the $80,000 amount under subparagraph (B) at the
same time and in the same manner as under section 415(d), except that the base
period shall be the calendar quarter ending September 30, 1996.
Id.
152. See Treas. Reg. § 1.410(b)-l(b) (as amended in 1993):
Coverage tests---(1) Percentage test. A plan satisfies the requirements of this sub-
paragraph if it benefits-
(i) seventy percent or more of all employees, or
(ii) eighty percent or more of all employees who are eligible to benefit under the
plan if 70 percent or more of all the employees are eligible to benefit under the
plan,
excluding in each case employees who have not satisfied the minimum age and
service requirements (if any) prescribed by the plan, as of the date coverage is
tested, as a condition of participation and employees permitted to be excluded
under paragraph (c) of this section. The percentage requirements of this sub-
paragraph refer to a percentage of active employees, including employees tem-
porarily on leave, such as those in the Armed Forces of the United States, if such
employees are eligible under the plan.
Id.; see also ROSE & CHOMMIE, supra note 10, at 262-63. The three alternate coverage
tests are: (1) the plan must benefit 70% of all non-highly compensated employees; (2) the
percentage of non-highly compensated employees benefiting under the plan must be at
least 70% of the percentage of highly compensated employees benefiting under the plan;
(3) average benefit percentage of non-highly compensated employees must be at least
70% of that for the highly compensated employees. See id.; see also I.R.C. §
401(a)(26)(A) (providing that a trust must benefit the lesser of 50 employees or more than
40% of all employees).
153. See LEWIS AND ROCA, L.L.P., When IRS Says Independent Contractors are
Common-Law Employees, Benefits Liability May Follow, 3 ARIz. EMPL. L. LETTER 416,
418 (1996), available in LEXIS, Labor, News & Information Library (finding the message
to employers from Vizcaino H is "without a doubt" the need for correctly classifying
workers). Potential liabilities for classifying workers incorrectly include employee taxes,
such as FICA and other withholdings, and employee benefits. See id. The liabilities are
significant because the hiring of independent contractors may have been for the purpose
of avoiding the higher payments associated with employee benefits. See id.; see also
DENLINGER, ROSENTHAL & GREENBERG, Partners and Contractors: Your "Employees"
Under Labor and Employment Laws?, 2 OHIO EMPL. L. LETTER, Feb. 1997, available in
WESTLAW, 8 No. 2 SMOHEMPLL 2; FELHABER, LARSON, FENLON & VOGT, P.A.,
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ures.'14  Preventive measures include waivers, clear and unambiguous
plan documents, consistent language in all company literature, utilizing
different pay structures for distinct categories or workers, and hiring
through temporary leasing agencies."' A section 530 defense, which is a
payroll tax liability provision enacted as part of the Revenue Act of 1978,
and self-correction of the plan are two solutions to correct classification
problems that arise.'56
1. Preventive Measures
In Vizcaino II, the court did not decide the issue regarding the agree-
ments the workers signed waiving their rights to benefits. 5 7 One criticism
of this decision is that the court failed to take the opportunity to confront
the issue of the validity of waivers of federally regulated benefits.5 The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit did not decide this issue because
Employers Beware: You May Have More Employees than You Realize, 6 MINN. EMPL. L.
LETTER 420, 420, 422 (1996), available in LEXIS, Labor, News & Information Library;
Kenneth S. Weinstock, Contingent Workers May Be Costly, 9 CONN. EMPL. L. LETTER,
Sept. 1997, available in WESTLAW, 5 No. 9 SMCTEMPLL 1; B. Randolph Wellford, Jr.
& William D. Perun, Misclassification of Workers Risks Pension Plan Problems, 8 VA.
EMPL. L. LETTER 427 (1996), available in LEXIS, Labor, News & Information Library.
154. See Wheaton, supra note 88, at 9H (explaining that employers having contingent
workers, including independent contractors, need to learn to manage associated risks).
An enormous liability is not necessarily the employment taxes, but the cost of providing
employee benefits retroactively. See id. Furthermore, the risks include disqualification of
a retirement plan. See id.
155. See id. (providing ten steps for minimizing the risks of misclassification). These
steps are:
1. Determine what plans exist...
2. Define eligibility and benefits for contingent workers ...
3. Define when a status change occurs and what happens...
4. Address benefits by contract before engaging independent contractors or
leased employees...
5. Coordinate plans, summary plan descriptions, insurance policies, employee
handbooks and internal policies ...
6. Provide broad claims procedures which incorporate 'discretionary' authority...
7. Monitor legislative and judicial developments...
8. Prepare considered responses to requests for information and claims denials...
9. Reserve the right to amend, modify and terminate plans...
10. Determine the fiduciaries and their duties...
Id.
156. See Lurie, supra note 17, at 1363; see also C. Frederick Reish and Bruce L. Ash-
ton, Self-Correction of Plan Defects Under the Service's New Administrative Policy,
87 J. TAX'N 182, 182 (1997).
157. See Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 120 F.3d 1006, 1012-13 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc)
(Vizcaino II) (explaining that a waiver analysis would not apply to the agreements, and
that Microsoft agreed that this was not a waiver case).
158. See Recent Case, 111 HARV. L. REV. 609, 612 (1997) (noting that the Vizcaino H
court failed to confront the issue of waiving federally regulated benefits).
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waivers must be intentional and knowing. Workers incorrectly classified
cannot know they qualify for benefits; therefore, they cannot make a
knowing waiver.
One solution to the knowledge requirement attending waivers is for
the employer to include clear language in the plan document regarding
the specific benefits to which the independent contractor is entitled. 6 A
clear reflection of the intention of the parties may alleviate confusion if
the independent contractor is later reclassified as a common-law em-
ployee.' Although intent is only one factor considered by courts apply-
ing the right-to-control test, this provision will enable the courts to assess
intent clearly.'62
The Vizcaino II court, placing great weight on plan documents,'63
warns employers to draft benefit plan documents carefully.' 64 Microsoft's
SPP plan document granted the plan administrator discretion to construe
the terms of the plan and determine eligibility.165 On remand, the Ninth
Circuit instructed the plan administrator to determine whether workers
were eligible for the benefits in question.1'
Plan documents should specify the eligible participants. 67 This way,
courts would not mistake the company's intent to exclude independent
contractors from the benefits' plans.' 6' With regard to the ESPP, the
terms of the plan indicated that Microsoft intended to make all common-
169law employees eligible for participation. If the plan documents ex-cluded all workers classified as independent contractors, Microsoft may
159. See id. (emphasizing that knowledge and intent are particularly important ele-
ments in federal benefits law).
160. See Short, supra note 108, at 411 (providing that plan language should also ad-
dress the eligibility of an independent contractor reclassified as a common-law employee).
161. See id.
162. See id. (suggesting an employer should include a provision that cash payments are
the sole compensation for independent contractors, even if reclassified as common-law
employees to ensure the intent of the parties is clear).
163. See id.
164. See id. (explaining that the most relevant aspect of Vizcaino H is the emphasis the
court places on the plan documents).
165. See Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 120 F.3d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc)
(Vizcaino IH).
166. See id. at 1014-15.
167. See Short, supra note 108, at 411 (explaining that the SPP defined eligible partici-
pants too broadly, so as not to exclude independent contractors explicitly).
168. See id.
169. See id. (explaining that the ESPP document incorporated the Code provisions;
therefore, the court relied on this incorporation in finding that Microsoft intended to make
common-law employees (including the freelance workers) eligible to participate).
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have avoided its problems.7 '
Companies should also specify the categories of workers, not only in
plan documents, but also in all firm literature and contracts in order to
assist management."' This suggestion, however, does not provide com-
plete immunity from worker misclassification because the language of
documents and agreements will not prevail over the reality of the actual
employment relationship.'
Employers should also focus on pay structure, distinguishing pay struc-
tures for independent contractors from those of full-time employees.
73
Using different departments to pay employees, such as the payroll de-
partment and accounts receivable, establishes the parties' intent and em-
phasizes the difference between full-time employees and temporary
workers.' 74 The proper use of temporary employment agencies may help
distinguish independent contractors from employees. For instance, in
the situation that gave rise to Vizcaino, Microsoft dealt with its cyclical
need for workforce augmentation by using a temporary employment
agency to supplement its core of permanent employees on an as-needed
basis."'
Ideally, Microsoft should have originally engaged its supplemental
work force from a third-party leasing company that exercised genuine
supervision over the workers, including hiring and firing. 76 A pitfall of
the leasing arrangement is that a company can still lose its tax preferen-
tial status if the leased workers constitute actual employees. 77 Hence,
the employer needs to establish an authentic third-party leasing ar-
rangement-one that commits the control and manner of the off-payroll
170. See id.
171. See Renate M. deHaas, Employee Benefits, Vizcaino v. Microsoft, 13 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 483, 498 (1998). Once the proper language is used to establish definite catego-
ries of employment, deHaas suggests using the chosen language uniformly in all contracts
and agreements, avoiding any ambiguity. See id.
172. See id. at 498-99 (explaining that it is not expensive or difficult to implement dif-
ferentiated language for independent contractors in company literature).
173. See id. at 498.
174. See id. (indicating that even though Microsoft was not protected by paying some
workers through accounts payable expenses, while paying employees through payroll, do-
ing so could protect other companies when the courts assess all factors together).
175. See Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 120 F.3d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc)
(Vizcaino II); Lurie, supra note 17, at 1359, 1360-61.
176. See Lurie, supra note 17, at 1360-61 (explaining that Microsoft should have origi-
nally engaged the workers under bona-fide, third-party leasing arrangements).
177. See Bronk v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel., Inc., 140 F.3d 1335, 1138-39 (10th Cir.
1998) (finding that employers are not required to provide benefits to leased employees,
but that leased employees are taken into account in showing that a company's plan meets
the nondiscriminatory coverage requirements of the Code).
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workers' performance to the leasing agency.78 Such an arrangement may
have conferred sufficient indicia of independent contractor status on the
supplemental workers to allow Microsoft to withstand an IRS chal-
lenge. 79
2. Defensive Measures
Formerly, an employer could be exempt from the tax liabilities result-
ing from worker reclassification if the employer relied on a prior judicial
or administrative ruling in classifying the worker; if a recent tax audit did
not result in reclassification; or if ordinary industry practice involved
classifying workers as independent contractors.' 8° Using this shield,
known as the section 530 defense, allows for relief of payroll tax liability,
but will not cure the problems associated with qualifying the pension
plan for tax preferential status.'8 ' Recently, Congress enacted the Small
Business Protection Act of 1996, which modifies the section 530
178. See Lurie, supra note 17, at 1360-61.
179. See id. (cautioning that a leasing company would need to retain real powers over
its leased workers, and not just ornaments of control). The IRS would then find the em-
ployer-employee relationship between the leasing company and the employee.
180. See id. at 1363 (noting that the purpose of section 530 is to insulate certain em-
ployers from payroll tax liabilities because they have relied on a prior judicial or adminis-
trative ruling, a tax audit, or industry custom).
181. See id. (explaining that section 530 is applicable only to the disposition of payroll
tax issues).
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 49:505
defense."" The modifications primarily benefit employers. 13
Corporations can take advantage of the recently issued IRS Adminis-
trative Policy Regarding Self-Correction (APRSC) to correct plan dis-
qualification.1 4 The APRSC allows plan sponsors the opportunity to
make retroactive corrections of eligible plan defects without notice to the
IRS and without penalty."5 A limitation of APRSC is that the employer
182. See id. (explaining that section 530 of the Revenue Act of 1978 was intended to be
"an interim solution" for disputes between the IRS and employers over payroll tax liabili-
ties). Section 530 was extended several times and in 1982 given an "indefinite extension."
See id. The enactment of the Small Business Protection Act of 1996 reshaped the way in
which section 530 will work, primarily to the benefit of employers. See id.; see also Small
Business Act: S Corporation Relief and Pension Plan Reform, J. AccT., Nov. 1996, at 25
(providing that the intent of the Revenue Act of 1978 was to provide relief to employers
by prohibiting the IRS from imposing liability on an employer when the IRS reclassified
an independent contractor as an employee if the employer reasonably treated the individ-
ual as an employee). Because the IRS took harsh positions on the interpretation of the
Revenue Act of 1978, the Small Business Protection Act of 1996 created modifications to
lower the number of disputes between the IRS and employers over classification of work-
ers. See id. The four modifications are:
[1] Reclassification relief even if the IRS had not previously determined the
worker was a common-law employee.
[2] Shifting the burden of proof to the IRS when employers have established suf-
ficient evidence that it was reasonable not to treat a worker as an employee.
[3] Enacting a safe-harbor provision for industry practices when 25% of the in-
dustry followed the same classification approach.
[4] Changing the safe harbor for audits beginning after December 31, 1996, to in-
clude an examination (for employment tax purposes) of worker classification.
Id.
183. See Lurie, supra note 17, at 1363-64 (explaining that the Small Business Protec-
tion Act of 1996 trimmed the prior audit defense when the audits began after December
31, 1996, but reaffirmed the ability to rely on prior audits that began before January 1,
1996).
184. See Reish & Ashton, supra note 156, at 182 (providing that the IRS Employee
Plans Division released the APRSC in December 1996 to its essential district offices to
replace the little-used Administrative Policy Regarding Sanctions).
185. See id. (explaining that self-correction allows a corporation to essentially re-
qualify a benefits plan without IRS involvement). The limitation, however, is that self-
correction is available only in the following two circumstances:
Virtually any eligible defect, no matter how serious, may be corrected under
APRSC during the first plan year after the defect occurs so long as the plan is not
under IRS examination. This is referred to as the "Self-Correction Procedure"
(SCP).
Defects that are "insignificant" are considered to be "nondisqualifying defects"
and may be corrected at any time (both before and during an IRS examination).
This portion of the Policy has been labelled the "Insignificant Defect Procedure"
(IDP).
Id. (citations omitted).
There is no fixed criteria for determining whether a defect is insignificant, but the follow-
ing seven factors are applied to a facts-and-circumstances test:
1. The number of violations during the period under examination.
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can correct the defect only if the plan is not under IRS examination."'
Eligibility for APRSC requires that the qualifying benefits' plans es-
tablish practices and procedures designed to promote and facilitate com-
pliance with § 403(b) and § 401(a) of the Internal Revenue Code.'8 Ad-
ditionally, the violation that the employer seeks to correct must occur by
mistake or oversight in applying the terms of the plan.'m APRSC can be
very helpful as a preventive measure, if the employer finds the defect or
misclassification within the first year after it occurs."'
In Vizcaino, however, Microsoft could not have used APRSC because
the IRS began an examination of its employment records before the de-
fect (or misclassification) was found.'O Nonetheless, APRSC is a useful
2. The percentage of plan assets and contributions involved.
3. The number of years in which the violations occurred.
4. The number of participants affected relative to the total number in the plan.
5. The number of participants affected relative to the number that could have
been affected.
6. Whether correction was made prior to examination.
7. The reasons for the violations (such as data errors).
Id. at 187.
186. See id. (explaining that the APRSC is a significant step in alleviating the require-
ments of self-correction, but limitations to APRSC include the eligibility criteria).
APRSC is applicable only to operational defects, not to form defects. See id. at 183. Op-
erational defects constitute failing to follow the terms of a plan document. See id. The
APRSC will not alleviate misclassification problems if the plan discriminates in favor of
highly compensated employees, in which case the employer may need to amend the plan
to cover the additional participants. See id. Amendments to the plan are not covered by
APRSC. See id.
The second requirement of eligibility is that the plan administrator must show that s/he
established practices and procedures reasonably designed to permit compliance with the
plan qualification requirements, and that the violation occurred by oversight or mistake.
See id. at 184.
The third requirement is that all defects must be corrected for all years, including pro-
viding all retroactive benefits to the participants that should have been included in the
plan. See id. at 185. The most limiting aspect of APRSC is the discretionary power of the
critical district offices to determine if a business fulfills the APRSC requirements. See id.
In addition, there is no appeal mechanism after the key district office makes its determina-
tion. See id.
187. See id. at 184.
188. See Kelley, supra note 7, at 101. Misclassification of workers can result in dis-
qualifying a plan. See id. Therefore, if the corporation takes corrective actions and pro-
vides the appropriate retroactive benefits, the plan can remain qualified for purposes of
receiving the tax deductions. See id.
189. See Reish & Ashton, supra note 156, at 188 (explaining that this short "window of
opportunity" is a major limitation of the utility of APRSC).
190. See Vizcaino v. Microsoft, Corp., 120 F.3d 1006, 1008 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc)
(Vizcaino II) (noting that the IRS examined Microsoft's records in 1989 and 1990 and de-
cided that taxes should have been withheld and paid because the workers were employees
rather than independent contractors). Microsoft's hypothetical use of APRSC assumes, of
course, that Microsoft believed the misclassification of the workers was a defect. Micro-
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tool for businesses that discover that they have classified their workers
incorrectly within a year of the actual misclassification.
IV. CONCLUSION
Careful preparation in drafting pension plan documents can save a
business from enormous tax liabilities. IRS reclassification of independ-
ent contractors as employees creates payroll tax liabilities and jeopard-
izes the qualification of a pension plan, resulting in a loss of tax preferen-
tial status. Classifying workers correctly from the time of hire can
alleviate certain tax liabilities. Although not dispositive, consistent lan-
guage in all company literature and in contracts can help the courts in
evaluating a company's intent. Ultimately, a company needs to retain
the right-of-control over its employees, not its independent contractors,
in order to avoid tax liability for incorrect classification.
soft conceded that the workers were misclassified for the purposes of Vizcaino II; hence,
the court never resolved this issue. See id. at 1010; see also Lurie, supra note 127, at 1633
(explaining that the worker classification issue was not addressed when the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals decided Vizcaino Ien banc).
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